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A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
The Active Inference framework (Friston
et al., 2009; Friston, 2010) argues that
the brain’s generative models continuously
produce predictions and goals that guide
its action (active inference) and perception
(predictive coding) through free energy
minimization. In this framework, most
studies have focused on the on-line predic-
tion of perceptual events and the control of
overt behavior.We propose that the frame-
work can be extended to explain cognitive
control.
We assume that architectures of cogni-
tive control are elaborations of the predic-
tive architectures of sensorimotor behav-
ior in early living organisms. As the senso-
rimotor control system of early organisms
evolved (to face increasingly harder indi-
vidual and social problems), it gradually
began predicting increasingly long-term
and abstract consequence of behavior
and—critically—doing so off-line and
without overt behavior. This permitted
rehearsing action sequences without exe-
cuting them. In turn, off-line predictions
opened the doors to higher cognitive abili-
ties, such as planning, emulation, imagery,
mental state inference, goal-directed
decision-making, prospection, and the
acquisition of declarative knowledge
(Hesslow, 2002; Grush, 2004; Jeannerod,
2006; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007,
2009; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009; Pezzulo,
2011; Clark, in press).
We argue that off-line predictions
opened the doors to executive functions
and cognitive control, too. Executive func-
tions, typically linked to prefrontal cor-
tex, are self-directed actions functional
to self-regulation and the coordinated
planning of present and future actions and
goals toward distal objectives. Executive
functions (and prefrontal cortex function-
ing) have been linked to a plethora of
processes, including the self-generation of
goals and plans, their maintenance in
working memory, their monitoring, the
inhibition of prepotent but inappropri-
ate actions, the regulation of attention,
and valuation processes. A reconciling per-
spective is that prefrontal cortex supports
“cognitive control”: the control of thought
processes and the top–down guidance of
overt behavior toward distal goals (Fuster,
1997; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Botvinick,
2008).
We cast cognitive control within the
Active Inference framework. We argue that
cognitive control consists in a nesting of
optimizations (i.e., free energy minimiza-
tion loops) over time; in addition to the
usual overt loop of active inference, one
(or more) covert loop(s) help optimiz-
ing distal goals. The left part of Figure 1
shows the Active Inference framework, in
which predictions and goals steer percep-
tion and action via free energy minimiza-
tion. Note that here predictions are relative
to the present situation. The right part of
Figure 1 shows an extension of the frame-
work that includes Controlled Predictions
and a nesting of optimizations (for sim-
plicity we only show two loops).
The covert loop works off-line via the
suppression of overt sensory and motor
processes (in the Active Inference frame-
work, this requires the suppression of
proprioception). This permits running
imaginary actions that produce a sequence
of fictive actions and of predictions rel-
ative to future (rather than present) sit-
uations. Fictive actions and predictions
can be optimized via free energy min-
imization but without overt execution:
they are not just “mind wandering” but
are truly controlled toward goals specified
at higher hierarchical levels. Prospection
and planning are thus optimization pro-
cesses that support the generation of distal
and abstract goals (and associated plans),
beyond current affordances. The covert
loop supports also the recall of learned
contextual goals and rules rather than
always forming them de novo via active
inference.
The selected goals can thus be set as
priors for the overt loop. In the Active
Inference framework, this has the same
effect as goal maintenance in working
memory, and affords the top–down guid-
ance of overt behavior beyond stereotyped
responses, which is the hallmark of cogni-
tive control. [Note that specifying contex-
tual rules or plans to distal goals requires
setting strong priors over sets of states and
transitions rather than just one set point
(Friston et al., 2012)].
Active inference in the overt loop
ensures that the goals (and plans) gener-
ated by the covert loop are achieved in
practice. In turn, feedback from the overt
loop is informative of (changing) environ-
mental constraints; it permits revising and
re-situating imagined goals, and ultimately
achieving them in the current context. In
some cases, the overt loop is recruited for
planning and thinking, too, such as for
instance when Tetris players rotate blocks
to better decide where to place them (Kirsh
and Maglio, 1994).
Our view is compatible with theo-
ries of cognitive control that highlight
the active maintenance of goals in work-
ing memory (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
However, we assume that cognitive con-
trol and mental operations are internal-
ized forms of overt actions and recruit the
same brain structures, rather than involv-
ing separated neural representations and
dedicated, modular processing (Diamond,
2000; Barkley, 2001; Cotterill, 2001; Ito,
2008; Pezzulo, 2011).
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FIGURE 1 | Left: Active Inference framework. Right: “Controlled Predictions” and cognitive control.
We propose that the nesting of opti-
mization processes is mainly realized in
prefrontal hierarchies and is functional to
the achievement of goals at different time
scales. Compared to overt action, cog-
nitive control optimizes at longer time
scales, and requires maintaining goal rep-
resentation (priors) for a long time. It
is thus not surprising that cognitive con-
trol processes (and in our proposal, covert
loops) mainly involve high hierarchical
levels. This creates a potential confound,
suggesting that cognitive control might
also require dedicated neural resources
or modularized processing. However, our
proposed architecture can be implemented
within a homogeneous (cortical) hierar-
chy performing free energy minimization;
which ones of the hierarchical levels are
recruited to work covertly depends on task
demands (say, abstract thought vs. the
mental imagery of rotating an object with
the left hand).
Our view suggests that executive func-
tions and forethought might have resulted
from an internalization of the process of
predicting the consequences of actions,
which permitted to endogenously steer
and control covert predictive loops. Partial
support for this view comes from the close
relationships between the neural systems
for motor preparation andmental imagery
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). Furthermore,
in our proposal cognitive control requires
the coordination of overt and covert pro-
cesses. Disruption of this process might
result in the execution of imagined actions,
as it was reported by Schwoebel et al.
(2002) in the case of a patient with bilat-
eral parietal lesions who was unable to
refrain from executing imagined (hand)
movements.
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